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I.  Introduction
The signing of the Single Act in 1987 was shortly followed by the Reform of the
Structural Funds in 1988.  In so doing, it was recognised that the Myrdalian
(Myrdal, 1957) prospect of the new Single Market widening the gap between the
poorest and the richest regions of Europe needed to be counter-balanced by policy
instruments intended to the achieve the political objective of social and economic
cohesion.  This was pursued by encouraging the poorest regions of Europe to catch
up with the richest.  One of the main elements of the 1988 Reform of the Structural
Funds was the principle of subsidiarity, which for the first time entitled sub-
national governments to participate in the making of regional policies.  However,
we argue that the heterogeneity in the forms of local governance across the EU
undermined the initial success of structural policies and therefore the achievement
of the broader aim of economic convergence.
The main objective of this paper is to show that European regions have not
experienced a process of economic convergence, as measured in terms of GDP per
capita, over the period 1989-97.  In contrast, inter-regional differentials peaked in
the early 1990s, flattening out since 1994.  We explain the presence of this peak by
discussing the implications of the principle of subsidiarity (together with the
principle of partnership) for European regions.  We argue that despite being an
important step forward in policy-making, subsidiarity only provided regions with
an entitlement to access EU funding, and overestimated their capacity to activate3
such entitlement through effective participation.
1  This handicap has been even
more damaging because the Structural Funds were not set up simply to redistribute
resources from the richer to the poorer regions, but were also perceived as tools to
enable the weakest European regions to strengthen their economic position in order
to be better able to compete within the newly formed Single Market.  In other
words, if we use the methodological framework of theories of justice (Rawls,
1971), structural policies were a means “to align agents before the race starts”, to
equalise initial endowments before the market could take its course, rather than just
“redistributing resources ex-post”.  The inability of the weakest regions to exploit
the full potential of the Structural Funds has isolated them from the core regions of
the EU thereby preventing them from benefiting from the alleged efficiency gains
of the Single Markets, as well as threatening the political objective of cohesion,
solidarity and equity.
We examine how countries and regions became familiar with the mechanism of
funding allocation and how they have adjusted to the opportunity of self-
governance, for instance, by opening offices in Brussels, nominating European
officers or establishing European Units (Martin, 1998; Mawson, 1994).  Regions
have climbed what John (1994) calls the “ladder of participation” in European
issues: to be informed, to have access to funding, to secure funding and to shape
European policy agendas.  The results of this learning process have only recently
started to show some results with the regional GDP per head gap narrowing
slightly.  Most recently, the reconsideration of the Structural Funds as part of
Agenda 2000 raises questions over where EU regional policy is heading, in
                                                       
1 For a discussion on the concepts of entitlements and capability, see Sen (1990).4
particular over the position of the laggard regions which have not developed
institutional capabilities to access their entitlements after the 1988 Reform.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 surveys conflicting findings on regional
convergence and discusses trends in regional disparities between 1988 and 1997.
Section 3 looks at the concept of subsidiarity and its intrinsic flaws. Section 4
assesses the allocative and distributive properties of European structural policies
using a simple yet revealing framework from theories of justice.  Section 5
describes the process of institutional adjustment that regions –especially the
weakest ones- have gone through; what Mawson (1994) defines as the
Europeanization of politics and policy.  Some final remarks conclude the paper.
II.  Regional Divergence
“It would be politically dangerous to allow the gulf between the rich and the less
favoured to become deeper”; with these words an opening paragraph of the Reform
of the Structural Funds (EC 1992) stressed the crucial importance of the political
objective of economic and social cohesion.  Much of the official literature
emanating at that time (Padoa Schioppa, 1987; EC  1992, 1993) described the
revamping of structural policies with the use of terms such as solidarity, equity and
cohesion.  These reflected the need to gather consensus around the creation of the
Single Market, especially in obtaining support from the weakest member states
which were concerned at being the losers in the new competitive arena.  In
economic terms, social and economic cohesion meant reducing regional disparities5
across the European Union as measured in terms of regional GDP per capita and
unemployment.  In fact, the increasingly important role given to regions within the
Reform of the Structural Funds necessarily shifted attention away from the national
to the regional dimension and, accordingly, from cross-country to inter-regional
disparities.
Almost ten years after the launch of the Reform of the Structural Funds it is
possible to assess to what extent regional convergence has occurred.  In practical
terms, regional disparity is measured as the standard deviation of regions’ GDP per
head normalised to the European average.  This enables a measurement to be made
of the spread of GDP per capita around the mean which mirrors the inter-regional
wealth gap.  In this paper we do not look at unemployment, which, although an
important measure of regional disparity, is in fact the result of micro as well as
macro-economic conditions and would therefore merit a separate discussion.
The existing literature on regional convergence provides conflicting findings.  On
the one hand, all official European publications seem in one way or another to
show that the poorest regions are catching up with the richest ones: since 1986 the
“annual growth of the four (cohesion countries of Greece, Spain, Portugal and
Ireland) has averaged just over one percentage point above average, giving rise to a
slow but steadily process of convergence with rest of the Union” (EC, 1996:19).
Martin (1998) finds a negative relationship between a region’s average per capita
growth rate and its income level (ß-coefficient) over the period 1987-94
considering 145 regions across the EU.  Similarly, Leonardi  (1998) looks at the6
standard deviation of regions’ GDP per capita from 1950 to 1995 for the nine
European countries before the entry of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986)
and finds that this has fallen continuously from 37.6 in 1950 to 24.3 in 1992.  The
unstated finding that the value for 1995 is actually greater (26.3) seems to suggest
that despite the effort to argue in favour of regional convergence, the data does not
quite support this.  Besides, although Leonardi succeeds in constructing a
consistent time series of data that spans five decades, the omission of the main
countries benefiting from regional policy reduces the relevance of the findings with
regard to the impact of the Reform of the Structural Funds.
In contrast, there has been a stream of contributions that have acknowledged the
polarisation of rich and poor regions. Amin (1997) notes that the gap remains
“extremely high” and argues that this is no surprise given that European regional
policy accounts only for 0.5 of the EU GDP.  Other contributions such as Quah
(1997), Hooghe (1998) and Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996) reach similar
conclusions.
One possible explanation for such conflicting results is that if one looks at regional
convergence over a long enough period of time and possibly from far enough, i.e.
using aggregate data, then there is no doubt that elements of convergence can be
found.  In order to avoid such bias, in this paper we focus our attention on
assessing the impact of the Reform of the Structural Funds over the period 1988-96
considering all regions of the 12 and after 1992 of the 15 member states.  Using
EUROSTAT data we have put together two sets of figures. One considers GDP per7
capita across the EU normalised for the European average which changed in 1992
when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU.  The second data set comprises
GDP per capita in PPS only for the 12 member states without Austria, Finland and
Sweden.
3
Table 1 below shows that if we look at the standard deviation of GDP per capita
across the nine years considered, it actually goes up in 1990, peaks in 1991 and
then levels off from 1993 onwards reaching more or less the same level as in 1988.
Table 1:
Regional Disparities in GDP per capita across the EU between regions, 1988-1996



















Best-off 182 173 183 209 196 190 196 195 193
Worst-off 40 39 34 36 37 39 39 40 44
Standard Deviation 26.8 25.4 27.9 29.5 28.3 27.1 27.1 27 26
Best-off – Worst-off 142 134 149 173 159 151 157 155 149
Best-off/Worst-off 4.5 4.4 5.4 5.8 5.3 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.4
10 Best-off 152 146 151 156 163 161 164 163 163
10 Worst-off 46 47 40 41 45 47 48 49 54
10 Best-off - 10 Worst-off 106 99 111 115 118 114 116 114 109
10 Best-off/10 Worst-off 3.3 3.1 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.0
25 Best-off 133 131 133 137 141 139 141 141 142
25 Worst-off 53 54 50 48 53 53 55 55 59
25 Best-off - 25 Worst-off 80 77 83 89 88 86 86 86 83
25 Best-off/25 Worst-off 2.5 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4
Source: Eurostat Regions, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999.
                                                       
3 We had to use GDP per capita PPS because most Eurostat data on GDP was normalised to EUR
15=100.  In contrast, as we wanted to look just at the trend of the regions’ GDP per head within only
the 12 member states we computed regional disparity as the coefficient of variation of regions’ GDP
per capita in PPS.8
The same trend can be found looking at the gap between the best-off (Hamburg)
and the worst-off (Alentajo (P) and Voreio Aigeio (EL)) regions: in fact in 1991
the ratio of the best-off region to the worst-off was 5:1, whilst in 1996 the ratio was
4:1.  If we look at the gap between the 10 best-off and the 10 worst-off regions, the
peak is in 1992 when the GDP per capita of the 10 poorest regions was 30 per cent
of that of the 10 richest regions.  The gap is slightly narrower if the 25 poorest
regions are compared with the 25 richest, but then still significantly higher than in
1988.
Looking at regional disparities over the whole period, it can be seen that in 1996
the standard deviation was only marginally smaller than in 1988, 26 against 26.8;
while the gap between the richest and poorest region was actually wider, 149.
Moreover, if we look at the composition of the bottom-25 regions, this has hardly
changed between 1986-96 (EC, 1999), with only four regions, Algarve (P),
Castilla-La Mancha (E), Kriti (EL) and Kentriki Makedonia (EL), having moved
up and disappeared from the bottom-25 group in 1996.  This would appear to
suggest that the same group of regions has consistently been at the bottom of the
ranking, although it must be noted that their average GDP per head has risen from
53 to 59.  The inertia of these regions is particularly worrying, since they are the
main beneficiaries of the Structural Funds as Greece, Spain and Southern Italy are
all Objective 1 areas.
Whilst the entry of Portugal, Spain and Greece clearly contributed to widen the
gap, the inclusion of Sweden, Finland and Austria within the European Union has9
to some extent reduced regional disparities since their average GDP per head is
around the European average.  For this reason we constructed a second set of data
from which we computed regional disparities only for the 12 European countries
before the last enlargement and look at the coefficient of variation of regions’ GDP
per capita in PPS.  This allows us to assess the trend of regional disparities
consistent with 1988 membership.  The findings confirm that regional disparities
increase from 1988 to 1991 and slowly level off thereafter, as shown in Table 2.
In fact, the coefficient of variation peaks at 0.314 in 1991 and drops to 0.298 in
1995.
Table 2










 Note: All NUTS 2, except for UK NUTS 1.
 Source: Eurostat Regions, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998
From both sets of data two main points emerge: one is that regional disparities
worsened in the early 1990s but that they also visibly improved thereafter, which
can be seen by considering both the 12 and the 15 member states.  The other point
is that the widening of the gap within Europe arrested but did not stop the process
of economic convergence that European regional policy pre-1988 had set in10
motion.  One possible explanation,
4 which we present here, is that this
phenomenon is the result of the weakest countries of the EU not being ready for the
Reform of the Structural Funds.
Until 1988 the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) provided funding to
member states on a national quota basis; the European Commission had no power
to decide on the use of such funding which was completely controlled by member
states.  It is well known how, for instance, the British government viewed its
allocation as a “reimbursement of its budget contributions” (Dardanelli, 1999:72).
The 1979 and 1984 reforms brought about some minor changes (minor especially
in comparison to the revolution in regional policy in 1988) which amounted to
budget increases, with the allocation of funding taking place through a mixed
system where part of the money was still distributed across member states
according to a fixed quota (95%) and part was given at the Commission’s
discretion (5%).  What did not change in these earlier reforms was the dominant
role still played by national governments which in effect kept deciding on where
and how the money should have been spent.  This procedure was not without flaws,
in part owing to inefficiency in the use of money by national governments, but
above all because it reduced regional policies to a dialogue between the
Commission and national governments.
                                                       
4 EC (1999) suggests that the recession in the early 1990s ought to be held responsible for the
increased divergence between poor and rich regions because of the “smaller capital flow from the
more prosperous regions” (P.2).  However, it could be argued that the doubling of the structural
funds was, in fact, a structured and institutionalised channel to pour monies into the poorest regions
and counterbalanced the effects of the economic recession.11
The Reform of the Structural Funds redesigned the entire framework of regional
support right from its basic principles through to practical procedures: the change
was drastic because the structural funds had to have a huge impact on the less
developed regions/countries of the EU in order to compensate them for the
imbalances brought about by the completion of the Single Market (Bliss and de
Macedo, 1990) and to try to force them to catch up with the wealthier regions.  The
critical concern was over a polarisation of wealth, of diverging growth paths across
different regions: “to ward off the threat of a two-speed Europe, the EC has
reformed the structural funds. The aim is to give the weakest regions the resources
to catch up progressively by making more rapid progress than the others, in spite of
their handicap.” (EC, 1992:10).
III.  Subsidiarity and Regionalism
The Reform of the Structural Funds changed the process of deciding the objectives,
aims and procedures for the allocation of funds and more importantly the actors
involved throughout the entire process.  In particular, four principles signposted the
new direction of European regional policies: concentration, additionality,
programming and partnership.  In this paper we focus on the latter which was
introduced hand in hand with the principle of subsidiarity.  As two sides of the
same coin, subsidiarity allows for the de-hierarchization (Tömmel, 1998) of the
decision-making process based on the assumption that different tiers of governance
can take care of different aspect of policy-making because of their complementary12
role.  In the case of European regional policy, complementarity stemmed from the
different inputs that sub-national, national and supra-national governments could
contribute in line with their complementary geographical perspectives.  In essence,
the definition of the principle of subsidiarity implies that “the right level of
government is then the lowest level at which the function in question can be
efficiently executed” (Padoa Schioppa, 1987:18).  Although some have argued that
it has been used by the Commission to gain control and decision-making power on
crucial issues of regional policy (Dardanelli, 1999), the intention can be interpreted
as a genuine effort to decentralise power and to involve sub-national governments,
to the extent of by-passing national governments when these were blocking change
as in the case of the UK (Bache, 1999; Martin, 1998).   The principle of partnership
solicits the three parties (sub-, national, and supra-national) to work together, to co-
ordinate their efforts in the design, programming, implementation and valuation of
regional policy.   In theory, this should allow regions to give voice to their local
needs, to promote bottom-up policy-making and to empower regions to decide on
their destiny.
The main point here is that within the Reform of Structural Funds, there was a clear
commitment to change the structure of governance within EU institutions, by
stimulating self-governance (Hooghe, 1998) on the side of the regions.  However,
we would argue that not all regions were able to be active partners together with
national governments and the Commission, and that to some extent this drastic
change was imposed on them.   First of all, regions had never before been involved
in European policies and had therefore never started or developed a dialogue with13
European institutions.  Whilst in some cases regions did not interact with their
national governments with regard to domestic regional policies, in other cases
regions did not even exist as geographical, administrative and political entities.  In
fact, regionalism in Europe appeared to be extremely heterogeneous.  Germany,
Belgium and Italy had regional institutions in place whose jurisdictional powers
varied greatly between them, Spain had 17 autonomous communities in pockets of
the country and France and Portugal were recognised by the Commission (EC
1992) as regionalizable. The remainder - Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom - were non-regionalized.  At the time of
the launch of the Reform, the Commission was aware that in practice only one
third of the member states were ready to activate the new procedure for the
allocation of the structural funds and these were those not prioritised to benefit
from the funds anyway.
In its Annual Report on the Implementation of the Reform of Structural Funds (EC,
1989: 17) the Commission  recognised that some countries were “under-endowed”
in terms of regional administrative resources, that the Reform would require a
“considerable change of attitude”, and that the implementation of the Reform was
“a gradual process”.  For instance, the decision in 1988 to classify Greece, Ireland
and Portugal in their entirety as eligible for ERDF funding for Objective 1 can be
read in two ways, which are not mutually exclusive.  One is that the entire space of
all three countries needed funding in equal way, the other is that they did not have
a sub-national tier of government to involve in the process for the allocation of
funds.  In assessing the implementation of the Reform, the European Parliament14
admitted that  “the Partnership programming negotiations between the Commission
and the Member States or regions thus ultimately meant significant delays in
numerous structural assistance projects, leading to quite striking under-
implementation of appropriations at the start of the programming stage.  But
national and regional co-ordination problems also exacerbated this effect”
(European Parliament, 1997).
At the time of the Reform sub-national governance varied greatly across the EU:
the main differences laid in regions’ administrative roles, in their decision-making
autonomy and in their policy making capacity.  Regionalism in the EU ranged from
federal states such as Germany and Belgium to very centralised states such as the
United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Denmark.  Italy, France and Spain
were in an intermediate position, having a decentralised administration structure
but with the degree of regional involvement in policy-making fragmented.  France
was well known for having a strong centralist state, whilst Spain had maintained
central control on key policy issues, albeit having recognised the need to devolve
autonomy to some regions with strong regional identities such the Basque region
and Cataluña.  Italy had democratically elected regional and local councils albeit
with limited power.  Moreover, in Italy there has always been an historical
difference between the Southern and Northern regional governments in the way
they have developed their capacity to support the local economy.  The centralised,
top-down approach adopted by the government to trigger industrial development in
the Southern regions in the 1970s and early part of the 1980s by-passed regional
and local governments, which had therefore forgotten how “to do” local15
development.  This heterogeneity of regional institutions in Italy suggests that
regionalism can be heterogeneous also at the national level because intra-country
differences exist and, if underestimated, can exacerbate rather than heal regional
disparity.  In particular, across the EU, economically weak regions exhibit either a
non-existent or a poorly developed regional institutional framework: Greece,
Portugal, Ireland, Italian Mezzogiorno and Spain are part of the Mediterranean belt
of  low performing regions which in 1988 had a GDP per capita (EUR12=100) of
around 30% below the European average (Greece, 54, Spain 75, Ireland 65,
Portugal  54 and Mezzogiorno 72) and at the same time were those without an
effective regionalised structure.
There seems to be, therefore, an inconsistency between the objectives and the
means embodied in the Reform of the Structural Funds.  On the one hand, the main
objective was to encourage the weakest regions to catch up with the best
performing ones in order to promote the harmonious development of the EU; on
the other hand, funds were allocated according to the principle of subsidiarity
which imposed a strain on the poorest regions because of the weakness or even
non-existence of their sub-regional governments.
The question to be raised is which European member states really pushed for the
Reform of Structural Funds in the form we discussed.  In other words, how
consensual was the decision to change the allocation procedure so drastically?  It is
already accepted that Spain and Portugal “extracted a doubling of the structural
funds as a side-payment for the consent to the internal market” (Hooghe, 1998:461)16
and in the same way, Greece was probably also persuaded to agree with the
Reform by the extra resources make available to Objective 1 regions which
accounted for 78% of the ERDF funding.  Behrens and Smyrl (1999) also argue
that the 1988 Reform was sold as an attachment to the Single Act and bought by
“recalcitrant peripheral member states”.  The apparently already accepted picture
that the lack of consensus on the introduction of the Single Act was healed by an
additional ECU 66bn of Structural Funds
2 underestimates the fact that the debate
on the content of the Reform itself was overshadowed by monetary figures.  We
would argue in fact that the doubling of money channelled to Objective 1
countries/regions distracted attention away from the salient points of the Reform
and to some extent was used as a settlement for the disruption that the new
procedures would create.  The Commission was aware of the problems that
targeted member states would have in the implementation of the procedure but the
aim to have in place a lean and accountable procedure for the allocation of one
third of its budget dominated the debate.
There is also the argument that the launch of the Single Market and the Reform of
the Structural Funds marked a change from a French to a German approach to
policy-making: less based on a centralist, legalist system and instead closer to a
federalist, multi-tier governance structure (Bianchi, 1992).  If this is correct we can
delineate a clear divide between those countries that pushed for the Reform and
those that were persuaded to go along with it. Germany, Belgium and France
(Delors was then President of the Commission) were the net contributors and only
marginal beneficiaries of the Structural Funds, and although keen politically to
                                                       
2 In 1988 structural funds rose from 17% to 27% of the EU budget.17
allocate resources towards the less favoured member states, they were also
concerned about the efficiency and effectiveness of such instruments.  On the other
hand, there is also the possibility that Germany, with its co-operative federalism
built on joint decision making, a legalistic tradition and the provision of ministerial
autonomy (Thielemann, 1999) was growing uncomfortable with the centralised
decision-making structures of the EU.
3  The solution was, therefore, to dilute
member states’ power by involving sub-national governments.
There is evidence that the main beneficiaries of the structural funds (Objective 1
regions) struggled to implement the new partnership procedures.  Hooghe (1998:
470) reported how Spain struggled to involve its regions because of “the lack of
administrative and technical know-how to be useful partners”.  On the other hand,
Italy was very uncomfortable with the idea of delegating power to -and sharing
decisions over the allocations of funding with - regions or other local actors as the
partnership model envisaged, but as in the best Italian tradition the view was
“better in than out”.  The inefficiency and the delay in the use of the funding was
such that in 1996 some projects funded under the 1989-93 budget were still
unfinished; some regions of the Mezzogiorno had to return ECU 518 million of the
allocated funds, and the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes –which were the
template for the Reform of the Structural Funds- had a failure rate in the South of
Italy of 32.6%, reaching as much as 56% in Sicily and 50.3% in Calabria (Monti,
1996).  The incapacity of Mezzogiorno’s regions to be active partners was not due
to intrinsic inefficiency, but to the fact that its under-development had been
                                                       
3 For example, Thielemann (1999: 411) notes a clash between the German co-operative approach
and centralised EU policies with regard to state-aids.18
considered by the Italian government as an emergency and therefore tackled with
ad hoc measures decided centrally and most of the time simply imposed on the
territory (Monti, 1996; Bianchi, 1992).  This produced an institutional hollowing-
out which made regional governments unable to participate in regional policy
making.
The UK’s position was rather different.  The absence of regional governments
could have put the UK in a difficult position in accessing the Structural funds, with
the exception of Wales and Scotland which already had active agencies engaged in
supporting and promoting local development.  However, the British government
continued to perceive the in-coming funding as a reimbursement for its
contribution to the EU budget which meant that the allocation of funding should be
at its discretion with no interference from the Commission and thus had little
inclination to devolve decision-making power to sub-regional governments.  The
British government also disputed the principle of additionality by using EU monies
instead of British monies rather than additionally (for a discussion of the RECHAR
dispute between the British government and the Commission, see Bache, 1999).
This constraint in terms of the shortage of matched-funding on the Britsh
government side (the principle of additionality required matched funding) reflected
the control that the centre wanted to exercise and its unwillingness to devolve
functions to sub-national bodies.
The allocation of powers between national and regional governments was therefore
not that envisaged in the principle of subsidiarity; indeed the European Parliament19
(1997) recognised the failure to involve sub-national government in the UK,
Ireland, Portugal, Greece and to some extent Spain and Italy, as seen in Table 3:









United Kingdom (England and Wales),
Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain*,
Italy*, Netherlands
France Germany, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, United
Kingdom, (Scotland), Spain**,
Italy**
*) Relates primarily to multi-regional assistance projects.
**) Relates primarily to regional assistance projects
Source: European Parliament (1997)
IV.  Entitlements but no Capability
The flaws of the Reform of the Structural Funds penalised at the very beginning
those regions and countries it was supposed to support.  In order to analyse the
nature of such flaws we use a framework which is suited to assess distributional
and welfare issues: the theories of justice.  We recall the contributions of Rawls,
Dahrendorf and Sen as they offer a different perspective on the principle of
subsidiarity within the Reform of the Structural Funds and provide a key to
understand the weakness of the method for allocating resources.  We describe and
analyse the events occurring at the end of the 1980s within the European
Community using the methodological framework of the theories of justice.  If we
imagine the inter-action between economic agents as a race that has a starting and
an end point, the theories of justice look at whether external intervention is needed
to ensure a fair outcome.20
The creation of the Single Market was justified in terms of efficiency gains, or in
terms of what Dahrendorf (1988) called increased provisions: this concept
comprises a broad range of material and immaterial commodities reflecting the
payoff or successful outcome from market interaction.  Dahrendorf (1988: 12)
defines provisions as “choices which may be opened up by entitlements”.  In fact,
the beneficiaries of the Single Market were all of the member states which were
entitled to have access to such provisions.  In this case, EU membership provided
all member states with the entitlement to benefit from the efficiency gains deriving
from the creation of the Single Market.  The concept of entitlement was introduced
by Sen (1981) as the right that gives agents “a rightful claim to things”.  However,
it soon became clear that the entitlement given by membership was not sufficient to
ensure member states that they would be able to reap equally the economic benefits
of integration due to their unequal initial endowments.  Disparities in the initial
provisions necessarily affects the ability of member states to gain from the Single
Market; in other words it affects their ability to acquire the provisions emerging
from the Single Market.
An adjustment mechanism therefore needed to be set up in order to bring equity
into the system and to counterbalance the disruptive effect that the pursuit of
efficiency alone would have produced.  The Reform of Structural Funds was
introduced as an instrument with distributive and allocative objectives.  It did not
only have to re-distribute resources from the rich to the poor regions/countries, but
more importantly it had to trigger or accelerate a process of economic development
in the poorest regions/countries in order to enable them to compete in the new21
competitive environment (Padoa Schioppa, 1987).  The allocative function of the
Structural Funds worked as a compensation mechanism aimed at aligning agents
before the race unfolded, i.e. the market, so that whatever the outcome of such
inter-action, inequalities were justified and hence politically and socially
acceptable within the European Community.  In other words, the fairness of the
competitive arena within the Single Market was intended to be underpinned by the
levelling of agents’ initial endowments, allowing thereafter the market to decide
winners and losers.  However, we argue that the Reform brought in an additional
element of “unfairness”, because it introduced a second tier of entitlement for low
performing countries and regions related to their eligibility to receive shares of the
structural funds according to their needs (i.e. Objectives 1-5b).  The key weakness
of the allocating system was such that the provision of the entitlement to access
funds was not associated with the capacity of agents to activate such right.  The
allocating mechanism pivoted around the role of sub-national governments, but
there was no provision to ensure that all regions could actively participate as they
were entitled to do; in other words there was no provision to ensure the fairness of
the process.  Rawls (1971) stressed that justice as fairness implies that an equal
allocation of “primary goods” (e.g. initial endowments) exists and that the rules
regulating the inter-action between agents are fair and guarantee the fairness of the
process of inter-action.  Only if the starting point and the process is fair is the
outcome socially acceptable even with disparities at the end.
In the Reform of the Structural Funds the principles of partnership and subsidiarity
did not address the differing institutional “capabilities” (Sen, 1981) of regions22
which determine their capacity to actively participate.  Although the Commission
was aware of the heterogeneity of regional governance across the European
Community, no attempt was made to draw up any measures in order to alleviate
institutional vacuums.  The only temporary solution which was adopted for Spain,
Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Greece was to allow them to put in national plans.  In
the 1989-1993 round, 60% of the structural funds were given to Objective 1 areas
(Greece, Portugal, Ireland, the Italian Mezzogiorno, 70% of Spain, French overseas
departments and Northern Ireland) which put forward 18 out of 140 plans
submitted to the EU Commission for Objectives 1 to 5b (EC 1989).  It could
therefore be suggested that the Commission adopted a market-oriented approach to
regional development, where after the initial provision of resources, regions
actually found themselves fighting for funding on unequal terms.  The competition
in the “structural funding market” dictates winners and losers: regardless of their
entitlement to access funds, those regions that do not have pro-active governments
will not be able to access funding and they will be the losers inside the group of
losers.  This has, as we showed, exacerbated inter-regional disparities in the period
just after the introduction of the 1988 Reform.  Besides, we found that over the
period 1986-96 intra-country regional disparities worsened for Greece, Spain and
Italy (see Table 4 below), while they improved for Portugal.  Unfortunately we do
not have any regional data for Ireland which has not been regionalised.
Given that stronger regional institutions tend to be associated with more developed
local economies, these have therefore been better able to access and to use the
structural funds, with the result of actually widening the gap with poorest regions.23
For instance, areas of Emilia Romagna (I) was classified as objective 2 because of
localised pockets of industrial decline although overall it had in 1996 a GDP per
capita far above the European average.  Emilia Romagna has been extremely
successful in using the resources it was allocated and benefited greatly from EU
funds.  Thus a relatively rich and well organised region was able to access
Structural funding, utilise it effectively, grow more quickly and increase the gap
with poorer regions.
Table 4: Regional Disparities in GDP per head
by Member State, 1986 and 1996
GDP per head
PPS (EUR15 = 100) Regional disparity
(standard deviation)
1986 1996 1986 1996
B 102.8 112.1 25.0 26.0
DK 112.1 119.3 - -
D - 108.3 - 30.2
D90
(a) 116.1 118.5 22.0 23.7
EL 59.2 67.5 6.0 8.6
E 69.8 78.7 13.7 16.8
F 109.8 103.9 27.8 29.0
IRL 60.8 96.5 - -
I 100.4 102.7 25.2 27.2
L 137.3 168.5 - -
NL
(b) 101.8 106.8 12.2 12.3
A 103.2 112.3 24.7 28.6
P
(c) 55.1 70.5 16.2 13.1
FIN 99.7 96.9 17.4 20.00
S 111.5 101.2 10.7 11.1
UK 98.6 99.8 19.6 18.5
EUR15 100.0 100.0 27.1 26.9
(a)  D90: excluding new German Länder
(b)  GDP disparity 1986: excluding Groningen
(c)  Employment growth: excluding Açores and Madeira
Source: Eurostat; DGXVI calculations24
Furthermore, sub-national institutions have reacted differently and at a different
speeds to the new procedure.  Indeed, there are signs that a painful process of
institutional adjustment followed the Reform of the Structural Funds.  We argue
that an evolutionary process of institutional convergence has been triggered by the
Reform.  Unequal institutional capabilities across regions are forcing a process of
evolution and to some extent natural selection.  Once the Reform was set up it soon
became very clear to regions – we will see in the following sections how regions
adapted and adjusted to the Reform - that survival meant being able to activate the
entitlement to access funding.  Therefore where they did not exist, regions were
created as a tier of governance to activate the triangle of European Commission,
national government and regional partnership.  Where they already existed, regions
moulded their institutional setting to respond to European regulations.  In both
cases a process of institutional adjustment was set in motion.
V.  Institutional Adjustment
It would seem too much of a coincidence that all across Europe processes of
devolution and regionalism have started simultaneously and in some cases
accelerated over the last decade.  We would argue that the first visible consequence
of the Reform of the Structural Funds was an induced process of institutional
adjustment occurring at the national level, with the sub-national institutional
framework converging toward a two or multi-tier system of governance according
to the openness of national governments to involve only regional governments or
also local private and public social partners in policy-making.  The move toward25
regional awareness, participation and more importantly empowerment marks a shift
from centralised to federalist forms of governance.  With the exception of Germany
and Belgium which already had a federalist structure, the other European member
states started this process of institutional adjustment from different points.  We can
identify three groups of countries according to their governance structures in 1988:
a) those that did not have a regional tier of governance (the UK, Greece, Ireland
and Portugal), those that had some form of sub-national institutions (France, Italy
and the Netherlands) and finally Spain which presented a mix of regional bodies.
We will show how regional governance in each of these has changed since the
1988 Reform.
The UK has always had a very strong central government, and with the exception
of agencies in Scotland and Wales, the lack of regional bodies able to inter-act with
the Commission and the British government forced actors in regions targeted with
objective 1, 2 and 5(b) to improvise regional consortia and fora as catalysts for
regional policy-making and implementation.  Such “institutional creativity” has
been needed to mobilise a broad range of local bodies.  For instance, in the West
Midlands a Regional Forum of Local Authorities was set up to work together with
training bodies, the voluntary sector, and higher and further education (Burton and
Smith, 1996).  In Merseyside, the Merseyside Task Force worked together with the
Government Office and public and private agencies to prepare Single Programming
Documents (Boland, 1999).  Such “policy networks” (Burton and Smith, 1996)
were however ad hoc solutions mainly set up to secure EU funding; their
composition tended to vary according to the circumstances, creating an unstable26
and uncertain link between the regions and the Commission.  Recently, the British
government has accelerated the process of regionalism by devolving powers to the
democratically elected Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly and by setting up
Regional Development Agencies in the English regions.  Even before devolution,
Scottish Enterprise and the Welsh Development Agency had been successful in
encouraging local development, and using these as a template the British
Government has set up RDAs.  These should channel local needs into strategy
plans to be then incorporated in the EU framework for the allocation of the
Structural Funds.
Ireland, Portugal and Greece only started to identify regional boundaries since the
Reform of the Structural Funds, without attaching to them any form of
decentralisation of power.  Institutional creativity has also played a role here in
forcing local actors to get together to respond to the principle of partnership.  In all
of these cases, national governments have played a crucial role.  Among these,
Greece is the only one where there has been no progress toward regionalism; in
fact in the second round of Structural Funds allocation, the role of the regions has
actually been reduced to the advantage of the national government.
The second group of countries, France, Italy and the Netherlands already had in
place a multi-tier system of governance with regional, provincial and local
councils; the reform of the Structural Funds started a process of actual
decentralisation of power to regions.  Among the three, the Netherlands is the
closest to a fully decentralised state, so very little institutional change was needed27
after the Reform (Boeckhout et al (1996).  France has since 1988 “triggered a re-
entry of central government officials engaging in public action at local level”,
“fuelled the emancipation of French regions and revealed the establishment of a
capacity for self-government at regional level” (Kukawaka and Smith, 1996:165).
Italy presents a situation where the Objective 1 regions in Southern Italy have been
unable to activate themselves to access EU funding specially set aside for them.
Although the institutional framework is in place, regional actors have had to learn
how to co-ordinate local actors to identify problems, to design policy interventions
and to implement them. In this case we are talking more of a learning process than
an institutional change which, it could be argued, would not have been initiated
without the 1988 Reform.
Finally, Spain seems to be a different case from those described above.  Spain has
17 regions (autonomous communities) which vary greatly in terms of power and
independence from Madrid.  The Spanish government “has continued to dominate
the drafting of the regional development plans and the multiregional plans” (Held
and Velasco, 1996:248) both for the first (1989-93) and second (1994-99) round of
Structural Funds.  However, strong and wealthy regions such Cataluña are
increasingly demanding more autonomy and there are signs that these demands
will be met.  Held and Velasco (1996) argue that Spain is moving towards a
federalist state quicker than any other member states: there are even talks about the
Senate being transformed into a Chamber of the Regions.  This shift towards
decentralisation is pushed both by strong demand for regional autonomy, as well as
by the encouragement that the EU has been expressing for multi-tier governance.28
Furthermore, we argue that institutional adjustment has been coupled with a
process of “institutional learning”.  Regional institutions have learned to establish
and nurture their own links with the Commission, by-passing national
governments.  The Commission has been very supportive in this respect.  Mawson
(1994) refers to 17 UK sub-national authorities having opened offices in Brussels
between 1989-94.  Martin (1998) carried out a survey of local authorities to assess
their relationships with the European Commission and found that 70% of them
employed one or more “European Officers”, one in ten had a purposely-set up
“European Unit” and one third had opened offices in Brussels.  Italy and Germany
also have regional offices in Brussels; France has purposely-appointed European
officers but these tend to be at the national rather than at the regional level.
Tömmel (1998) outlines a range of innovations that regional bodies have
introduced to implement European regional policies, including making available
sufficient budgetary resources to co-finance EU projects, the provision of new
services, and involving and coordinating social partners such as trade unions.
In addition, the Maastricht Treaty set up a consultation body for the regions, the
Committee of the Regions.  This formally acknowledges the significant role played
by the regions in conjunction with European institutions (the Commission,
Parliament and Council) in the making and delivery of policy.  Despite having only
an advisory function, the Committee raises and promotes regional issues and
interests not just with respect to regional policy, but also European environmental
and agricultural policies.  Some fear that this might be the first step towards having29
a Chamber of the Regions, perhaps directly elected by European citizens, sharing
power with supra-national institutions.  Whatever the precise future development
of this Committee, its establishment can be viewed as another step on the road
towards shared governance with the regions.
The processes of institutional adjustment and learning that the regions have been
going through have no doubt strengthened their ability to access and implement the
Structural Funds.  Regions have become active partners with the Commission and
national governments.  This is directly influencing the capacity of less-favoured
regions to catch up with the richest regions in the EU: the trend of regional
convergence suggests this is the case with the gap having narrowed since 1991.
The question now remaining is what is the future of regional policy in a multi-tier,
enlarged Union.  How prepared will the core states (and regions) of the Union be to
fund the development of the poorest regions?  How unbalanced will the Union be
following the Eastern enlargement?
VI.  Conclusions
The 1988 Reform 1988 revolutionised procedures for the allocation and
implementation of the Structural Funds.  We focus on the introduction of the
principles of subsidiarity and partnership, and show that the political objective of
economic and social cohesion was initially missed because of the flaws embodied
in the Reform.  In fact, we show that the gap between the poorest and richest
regions of the EU widened in the early 1990s and only then started to narrow.  We30
argue that the main reason for this was related to the inability of the regions in the
less favoured areas to be active partners in policy-making and implementation.
Such regional institutional inability, or in some cases vacuum, has prevented the
poorest regions from accessing and implementing the structural funds allocated to
them.  Only after a process of institutional adjustment and learning are some
regions now able to interact with the Commission and national governments on
regional policy issues.
Negotiations on the future of the Structural Funds as part of Agenda 2000 reveal
conflicting trends in thinking.  On the one hand, the role of some regions as
partners will be strengthened by stricter application of Objective 1 qualifying
criteria.  Thus Ireland was set to lose Objective 1 status completely unless the
country was divided into two regions (Redmond, 1999: 74).  On the other hand,
some of the “losers of the losers” as we call them, i.e. the laggard regions which
did not have the institutional capability to activate funding, now face a loss of
funding.  Thus the Italian government is diverting funding from “less efficient
parts” of the Mezzogiorno to other areas or programmes in Southern Italy
(Redmond, 1999: 74).  This is an implicit recognition that policy has not worked in
these areas as they did not have the capability to access their  entitlements.  Yet
simply stopping funding will not help such areas, and may mean that what little
institutional learning and development has occurred will be stunted.
Such trends, combined with the Commission’s principle of concentrating funds to
reduce coverage from over 50% down to 35-40% of the EU’s population, and the31
desire of net contributors such as Germany to impose budgetary discipline, indicate
that feelings are changing with respect to cohesion.  Furthermore, the prospect of
enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe is perceived by some as watering
down the political will underpinning the European Union (Williams, 1997).  That a
cleavage between the core of Euroland and the rest of the EU will be reflected in a
loss of interest in the political objective of social and economic cohesion is a
disturbing possibility.  This would discourage further financial transfers from rich
to poor regions, thereby retarding the process of economic convergence.  The
prospect of a multi-speed or variable geometry EU is thought by many to be
inevitable, but the impact that this may have on the stability, security and cohesion
of the EU has been greatly underestimated.  Will be crumbs falling from the high
table of the core regions of Euroland be enough to keep the rest of the EU happy?
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